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Abstract
Based on the promising democratic changes around the world during the late twentieth 
century, what are the favorable factors for building democracy? In the 1990s, research on 
democratization mushroomed, exploring how to explain reasons for democracy around 
the world. The global spread of democracy resulted in numerous conclusions about 
national and international favorable factors for democracy. More recently, the global 
democratic upsurge seems to have halted with worrying tendencies toward new forms of 
authoritarianism, hybrid regimes of both democratic and authoritarian institutions and 
fragile democracies. Recent studies have argued how authoritarianism has gone global 
and challenge the previous global spread of democracy. Based on a literature review 
of the bulk of studies on democracy building, this chapter identifies the main national 
and international favorable factors for democracy. It is argued that research has had a 
domestic focus up until the 1990s, but how international factors have come to play an 
important role in explaining democracy. Today, research must focus on the interplay 
between national and international factors to democracy building embedding both an 
actor and a structural dimension.
Keywords: building democracy, authoritarianism, transition, national factors, 
international factors
1. Introduction
There is an agreement in research about democracy building (democratization) that the pre-
vious century consisted of major ideological battles. Scholars on democracy building have 
argued that the last decades of the twentieth century consisted of a spirit of democracy with 
a growing number of democratic states around the world. From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, 
a global spread of new democracies occurred in most regions of the world—except the 
Middle East—and challenged post-totalitarian and authoritarian states, military regimes and 
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despotic leaders in Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa and Central and Eastern 
Europe. These political changes made scholars portray the global changes in terms of “the 
triumph of democracy,” [1] “the end of history,” [2] “the democratic revolution” [3] and how 
democracy had become “globalized” [4] as a third “universal language” aside from money 
and the Internet [5].
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, authoritarianism has gone global and 
is challenging democratic regimes and the notions of political rights and civil liberties around 
the world. Recent studies from the early 2000s and forward have pointed at a potentially 
worrisome trend in new types of authoritarianism and hybrid regimes [6] comprising both 
authoritarian and democratic institutions. This trend may have left the world community at a 
crossroads of democracy and authoritarianism. The global spread of democracies during the 
late twentieth century and the rise of authoritarianism in the early twenty-first century have 
raised an interest in understanding and explaining how to build democratic states around the 
world [7]. This study chapter sets out to understand how to build a democracy by identifying 
national and international favorable factors for democracy building. Section 2 after this intro-
duction illustrates the global patterns of democracy building over time and is followed by 
Section 3 on the theoretical foundation of democracy. Sections 4 and 5 explain the favorable 
national and international factors for building democracy. Section 6 concludes this study.
2. Trends of democracy building
In the early 1990s, studies on democracy building mushroomed, identifying how the number 
of democracies worldwide had become greater than ever before in modern history. About 
25 years ago, Huntington [8] identified major democratic waves in political changes, going 
from dictatorships to electoral and liberal democracies. The transition processes to electoral 
democracies centered on the establishment of popular votes and an election as the main com-
petition for office. The numerous transitions into electoral democracies around the world 
embedded the right to vote for competitive parties in free and fair elections where the elec-
toral outcome was respected and assured based on checks and balances between a country’s 
judiciary, executive and legislative powers.
In the early 1990s, Huntington argued that the historical global spread of democratic transi-
tions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could be described as waves of democracy 
building. A historical wave constituted numerous states around the world, all going through 
democratic changes within a specific period of time. In particular, a wave of democratic 
change included a larger group of transitions from nondemocratic (authoritarian) to demo-
cratic (electoral) regimes within a specified period of time, and this change outnumbered 
the reverse transitions into authoritarianism. The wave metaphor of global democratization 
had a great impact on the scholarly interests in the patterns of democratic change around the 
world. However, many scholars in the field of democratization raised concerns about how 
democratic regimes were defined, focusing only on free and fair elections (electoral fallacy), 
thereby disregarding other important democratic qualities, and the overlapping time periods 
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of these waves of democratization [9]. Most scholars who focused on democracy building 
agreed, however, that Huntington shed light on important historical transformations [10] in 
a suggested “two steps forward and one step back” pattern. Huntington summarized the his-
torical changes until the early 1990s in three waves of democratization and two reverse waves.
The first wave of democratization was the longest in terms of years covered (1828–1926). It 
was argued that the first wave began with the American and French revolutions and trans-
planted ideas of what democracy was all about and how democracy could be established. 
This wave of democratization included the spread of the political right to vote to new previ-
ously marginalized groups of society and to newly established states around the world, such 
as in the West, Australia and South America. The historical record showed how the first wave 
included democracy building in about 30 states after World War I. The wave of democratiza-
tion did, however, halt and was reversed with the authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies 
developed in Germany, Italy and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s, which resulted in reverse 
democratic setbacks and authoritarian regimes in Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as in 
South America.
The second wave of democratization (1943–1962) lasted for a far shorter time compared to 
the first wave and was an outcome of the major international political changes of the balance 
of power that came with the end of World War II and the defeat and collapse of Nazism and 
fascism. The collapse of antidemocratic systems resulted in the expansion of new democra-
cies in, for instance, West Germany, Austria, Japan, Turkey, Greece, Uruguay, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. The aftermath of the war became a window 
of opportunity for the new spread of democratic regimes, political rights and civil liberties in 
greater number of states, though primarily with the deviant cases in the communist states in 
foremost Eastern Europe and East Asia (China). It was the powerful role of the Soviet Union 
in a post-World War II context that eventually founded the reverse wave of authoritarianism 
and resulted in the consolidation of communism in the Eastern European states and in limited 
democracy in Latin American states and some East Asian states.
The third wave of democratization (1974–1991) was argued to have begun with transitions 
in Southern Europe in the early 1970s and ended with major democratic transformations in 
Eastern Europe as a result of a weakened and finally collapsed Soviet Union. Democratization 
began in Spain, Portugal and Greece and peaked with the transitions in communist ruled 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania and the independence of 15 new states. 
The third wave of democratic transitions was, however, global in a geographical scope, with 
numerous new democracies established in Latin America and Asia, outnumbering the previ-
ous authoritarian traditions of regimes around the world. The third wave had great global 
impact on the democratic political landscape. As stated, “the birth of more than ninety democ-
racies in this period represents the greatest transformation of the way states are governed in 
the history of the world” [11], and as a consequence, many scholars perceived the twentieth 
century as the century of progress [12].
Though the academic community had spent decades of research on how to explain and fore-
see democratization, the third wave of democratization came as a surprise [13] and sparked 
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greater interest in the geographical scope of transitions, the driving engines behind such 
democratic change and the possibilities of further democracy building within newly democ-
ratized states. Scholars agreed that the third wave was global in scope and how the numerous 
transitions actually led to the number of democratic regimes now outnumbering authoritar-
ian regimes for the first time in human history. Both scholars and international politicians 
argued how democracy was a symbol of good governance and how the wave of democratic 
transitions had shown “the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” in the 
world [14]. The global victory of political liberalism was argued to consist of the democratic 
transitions that established government by the people based on popular free and fair elections 
in multi-party systems. For almost half a century, the scholarly world had argued that democ-
racy was based on free and fair elections. In his famous study, Schumpeter [15] presented a 
minimal definition on democracy and became the founding father of a procedural definition 
of democracy. Schumpeter’s definition of an electoral democracy focused on competing polit-
ical elites for power. From this perspective, democracy was perceived as a political tool for 
selecting politicians and how popular elections, as a core political procedure, were essential 
for the spread and consolidation of other crucial political rights and civil liberties often tied to 
democratic systems and societies.
In the early 2000s, however, a growing number of individual academic studies, think-tanks 
and statistical assessments on democratic freedoms identified new challenges to the previ-
ous global transitions embedded in the third wave of democratization. Though this has not 
yet been argued to be the signs of a third reverse wave of global authoritarianism, schol-
ars have pointed out worrying signs of democratic challenges across the world. First, it has 
been argued that many transitional states have turned up as vague electoral democracies 
with authoritarian characteristics. They have had free and fair elections, but have continued 
to face political, economic and social obstacles that have had negative impacts on the democ-
ratization process. These obstacles have created political societies of democratic fuzziness 
where democratic patterns have been mixed with undemocratic ones. Such obstacles may be 
found in electoral democracies with patterns of restricted participation and liberties, electoral 
democracies influenced by the existence of personal rule and patron-client relationships, elec-
toral democracies with the existence of human rights abuses, electoral democracies in which 
there is a massive and perhaps uncontrolled popular mobilization that challenges order and 
stability and/or electoral democracies where undemocratic actors, such as the military, con-
tinue to influence politics. All these democracies may have elections and may tolerate legal 
alternative parties in opposition to the ruling party, but they are challenged by other major 
problems that influence the democratization process and democratic stability [16]. Second, it 
has also been argued that we have seen an authoritarian surge in international affairs with 
greater activities among major authoritarian powers to contain democracy around the world. 
Aside from limiting democratic rights and liberties at home, authoritarian states have actively 
coordinated foreign policy actions to halt the global spread of democracy. Such authoritarian 
measures have included media initiatives to limit the impact of Western news around the 
world, political actions against pro-democracy and human rights’ organizations, such as in 
global and regional intergovernmental organizations, and in civil society. Altogether, “The 
extent of the authoritarian challenges forces us to confront the disconcerting prospect that the 
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most influential antidemocratic regimes are no longer content simply to contain democracy. 
Instead, they want to roll it back by reversing advances dating from the time of the democratic 
surge” [17]. The increasing bulk of studies have presented different concepts to describe these 
challenged electoral democracies [18].
3. The foundation of democracy
There has been a long and on-going scholarly discussion on how to define and measure dem-
ocratic and nondemocratic regimes [19]. Democracy is a fuzzy and multifaceted concept. In 
the literature on building democracy, two conceptions of democracy are relevant; a minimal-
ist and maximalist perspective. First, the minimalist perspective has defined democracy as an 
electoral democracy, focusing on the procedural system of institutions and the institutional 
mechanism of free and fair elections. An electoral democracy has embedded the procedure 
of free and fair elections in which political elites compete for political power and where the 
population uses the election to check the political power from wrong-doings. The scholarly 
studies on electoral democracy has stressed the importance of political procedure to ensure 
political rights and civil liberties, although the main focus from a minimalist perspective has 
been on the implementation of elections as a guarantee for the idea of government by the 
people. Such definition of democracy has been argued to provide scholars with the ability to 
make comparative studies on democracy-building in different states by analyzing if there are 
free and fair elections or not [20].
Second, the maximalist perspective has, in comparison to the minimalist perspective on elec-
toral democracy, focused on a more substantive democracy embedding political rights and 
civil liberties beyond the procedure of free and fair elections. Such conceptualization of a lib-
eral democracy has developed out of the notion of the “fallacy of electoralism” [21], meaning 
paying too much attention to the election and missing out on other important political rights 
and civil liberties in a democracy. It has been argued that the fallacy of electoralism may lead 
to the definition of states as democracies, although such states consist of nondemocratic traits. 
Although free and fair elections are important in democracies, focus on electoralism only is a 
too narrow perspective on what democracy is all about. The maximalist perspective has there-
fore introduced the definition of a liberal democracy, based on the procedural ingredients 
in an electoral democracy, but also including additional rights and liberties in, for example, 
minority rights, politically equality, freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publica-
tion and assembly, the rule of law and securing human rights, etc. [22]. It has been argued 
that three fundamental dimensions exist in a liberal democracy; high level of competition, 
participation and liberties. As summarized by Georg Sørensen,
“Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political 
parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of 
force.
A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through 
regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded.
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A level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and 
join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation” [23].
The minimalist perspective and the maximalist perspective on democracy have provided 
scholars on democratization with important theoretical notions of foundations of democ-
racy. Overall, there has been a scholarly tradition to implement the minimalist definition of 
democracy when analyzing democracy-building, by focusing on free and fair election as an 
important mechanism to promote other political rights and civil liberties. This has resulted 
in the conclusion that building democracy is very much about institutionalizing free and 
fair elections. However, the scholarly studies on building liberal democracy have stressed 
the possibility and importance of further developing electoral democracies, beyond the free 
and fair elections, including political rights and civil liberties. Robert Dahl has presented a 
well-known conceptualization of a democracy (polyarchy). His definition of democracy may 
be seen as a midrange definition between a minimal and maximal definition of democracy. 
Dahl has presented two dimensions of a democracy in contestation and participation. First, 
contestation refers to structured political competition through free and fair elections and sec-
ond, participation refers to the popular right to participate as voters and/or politicians. In his 
definition of democracy, eight important institutions are mentioned. These are freedom to 
form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, 
right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, 
free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference. Although Dahl’s definition focuses on electoral procedures, 
contestation and participation also embed other political rights and civil liberties. To ensure 
the implementation of democracy in contestation and participation, it is argued that civil 
liberties are crucial. Such liberties are, for example, freedom to think, believe, worship, speak 
and publish one’s views as well as the freedom to form and join organizations among other 
things [24].
The scholarly discussion on definitions of democracy has come with studies on nondemocratic 
states. The process of democracy building starts in a nondemocratic environment which may 
be of different natures such as one-party-states, military regimes, dynastic rule, theocratic 
rule, tyranny, oligarchy, absolutism, despotism and monarchy, etc. The research on nondem-
ocratic regimes has set out different types. At first, democracies stood in sharp contrast to the 
totalitarian type. The totalitarian regime was characterized as a regime-type enforcing state 
objectives and goals on society and citizens, by concentrating all power to the elite and by 
subordinating societal activities and people to the control of the regime. In sharp contrast to 
a democracy, the totalitarian society was defined as an atomized society with very limited 
independent political, economic, social and judicial institutions due to the total control by 
the regime through the use of propaganda and terror [25]. To uphold total control, research 
has come to stress the importance of the implementation of an official ideology, single mass 
party, secret police, full control of communication, monopoly of coercive methods and a cen-
tral control of the economy [26]. Another and more common nondemocratic regime has been 
the authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime, compared to the totalitarian, has said to 
have a limited official ideology that dictates societal sectors and with a less powerful, violent 
and controlling police. The authoritarian regime is also open for socioeconomic pluralism 
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and to some degree political pluralism, although such pluralism is never allowed to become 
political influential and challenge the ruling political elites. It should, however, be stated that 
democracy-building is far easier to achieve in an authoritarian setting compared to a totalitar-
ian one. This is due to the existing political institutions in an authoritarian society, the allow-
ance of pluralism and political opposition and to the more limited use of state violence and 
terror compared to totalitarian systems.
4. Building democracy: national factors
The previous trends of democratic progress around the world, followed by recent pessimistic 
assessments of returning authoritarianism, have led to a redeveloped interest in how to build 
democracies worldwide. There is a long tradition of studying how to protect and promote 
democracy. The main focus has been to identify the explanatory factors or driving engines 
that encourage countries to transition to democracy and in how to consolidate new democra-
cies to become stabile and enduring. There has been a dominating focus on national factors 
for the transitions to democracy. The research on explanatory factors for building democ-
racy grew out of an increasing number of studies on domestic actors and structures of the 
1950s and onward, focusing primarily on socioeconomic factors. This approach was tied to 
developmental studies and was referred to as the modernization school or the moderniza-
tion thesis. One of the first and most important studies on economic development and its 
role in modernization was Dankwart Rostow’s Politics and the Stages of Growth [27]. In the 
1960s, in the context of decolonization and new independent states, studies focused on how 
to establish political order and stability. The modernization perspective on political order was 
illustrated by the famous study by Lipset, Political Man [28]. Lipset argued that moderniza-
tion, in terms of a high level of gross national product, was an important driving engine for 
building democracy. By assessing democracies around the world, it was convincingly argued 
how high levels of modernized socioeconomic structures were related to democratic states. 
In other words, states with economic modernization would become transitional democracies 
and, with further modernization, also become consolidated democracies. Lipset’s focus on 
economic factors for democratization could be summarized as the more well-to-do a nation, 
the greater the chances that nation will sustain democracy; this became a major insight on 
how to explain democratization and triggered further studies on when modernization has 
been an important explanatory factor to build democracies and when it has not.
Over time, new studies began to explore a more complex picture of modernization and 
democratization by unfolding a more detailed understanding about what economic and 
social indicators could trigger democracy building. These studies did not question the impor-
tance of modernization for political development, but pinpointed the economic and social 
structures that are needed to be developed to see democratization. It was argued that democ-
racy building was based on economic progress embedding improved infrastructure, higher 
levels of education, shared societal values and improved health, etc. The main point made 
was that modernization embedded social issues that became explanatory factors to democ-
racy rather than just focusing on pure economic growth. States with economic growth could 
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through political reforms to facilitate social structures that were beneficial for developing 
and consolidating democracy. In more recent decades of research done on the modernization 
thesis, economic progress leading to improved technology and the flow of information and 
knowledge has become new emphasized indicators for building democracy. The IT revolu-
tion has empowered people to engage in societal issues and provided people the tools to hold 
politicians and governments accountable for their decisions and actions, although research 
also stresses how authoritarian regimes may use new technology to haunt down political 
oppositions [29].
In addition, modernization was said to also impact the domestic class-structures. For instance, 
Moore [30], in the classical study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy—Lord and Peasant 
in the Making of the Modern World, argued the importance of the result of the modernization 
in the changes of the class structure. He stressed that modernization was not sufficient in 
deciding democratization, since such socioeconomic development with higher levels of gross 
domestic product (GDP) could also lead to authoritarian system. Modernization embedded 
more specific favorable factor for democratization in industrialization, urbanization, increased 
power to the middle class, decreased power to rural landlords and improved infrastructure, 
education and health care that all contributed to improved conditions for democracy. It was 
further argued that industrialization also integrated the commercialized countryside with 
urban areas, building ties between the urban middle class and rural peasants. Many studies 
have stressed the importance of a growing middle class to build democracy by integrating 
the lower and upper classes of the society into collaboration and unity. Socioeconomic mod-
ernization provides an economic and political ambitious middle class of business people, 
professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians and clerical and 
sales-workers. However, some studies have pointed out that the working class is pro-demo-
cratic, whereas the middle class is less interested in political change and more interested in 
protecting its economic role as an antidemocratic force, while other studies have emphasized 
the alliances between the working class and the middle class to build democracy [31]. The 
main argument has been that democracy is likely to develop based on industrialization and a 
growing power of the organized middle class and/or working class. Democracy is less likely 
to emerge in less modernized, agrarian societies and the dominating body of studies have 
stated a correlation between higher gross domestic product (GDP) and a growing middle 
class as the the main pro-democratic forces.
A second set of domestic factors to democracy aside from socioeconomic modernization 
includes the political culture. The perspective on political culture has referred to people’s 
aggregated political orientations/attitudes toward the political objects of a society, such as the 
institutions, politicians, norms and values. Such interest in political culture has also included 
the analysis of the political cultural in terms of existing religious and/or civilization codes 
within Protestantism, Catholicism, Confucianism and Islam [32].
The perspective on political culture was developed in the 1960s and onward and focused on 
issues of socialization and the political orientations in cognitive orientation (referring to the 
knowledge of and beliefs about the political system), affective orientation (feelings about the 
political system) and evaluation orientation (including commitment and support for political 
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institutions and the values and judgements of system performances). One pivotal study for 
this tradition of approaches for democracy building was Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture, 
where political culture referred to “the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” 
[33]. Their study analyzed the nature of the political culture that promoted and protected stable 
democracies and when political culture was defined as the aggregation of individual political 
attitudes. They argued that there existed three types of political cultures: the parochial, subject 
and participant culture. In the parochial culture, citizens were only indistinctly aware of the 
political system; second, in the subject culture, citizens saw themselves as subjects to political 
affairs rather than participants and third, in participant culture, citizens are participants of the 
system. The above-mentioned study stressed a connection between stable democracy and par-
ticipant culture, but added that the importance of elements of parochial and subject cultures. It 
was argued that in the participant political culture, citizens participated in political affairs and 
supported political affairs, as well as how the parochial and subject political dimensions made 
the participating citizens loyal to the existing political decisions and implementation proce-
dures, and thereby, they were supportive to the existing democratic institutions. It was further 
argued that a grave danger to democracy existed in too much of a subject culture because it 
could lead to an antidemocratic, authoritarian political system.
Other studies [34] about the role of political culture have focused on political culture as a 
multidimensional phenomenon and have measured people’s political support of political 
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. 
These studies have assessed that the overall citizens’ support of democracies is high around 
the world, but there are dissatisfied democrats in societies. Democracies embed an increas-
ing tension between democratic values, which are highly supported, and the trust in existing 
democratic institutions, which is declining. It has been concluded that there is high confi-
dence within established democracies regarding political objects in the political community 
and the regime principles, but less confidence and trust in regime performances, regime insti-
tutions and politicians. The reasons behind such tension may be the identified existing decline 
in social trust and civic engagement, failure in regime performances and constitutional design 
or cultural factors rooted in modernization and changing norms and values.
Important studies on modernization and shifting norms and values have added insight about 
potential explanatory factors and challenges for democracy. Inglehart [35] conducted the 
famous World Values Survey, assessing the patterns of political attitudes in states worldwide. 
From a comparative perspective and over a long period of time, this survey has analyzed 
political attitudes toward the political community, democracy as an ideal form of government 
and regime performance. This survey has identified a decreasing respect for political authori-
ties—such as in, for example, the police and political parties—and such declining respects 
is explained in terms of shifts in cultural values among citizens promoted by globalization, 
cultural transformations and modernization. The modernization process has fundamentally 
transformed the political and cultural system from being previously based on religious beliefs 
to political institutions, rational behavior and post-materialist values of maximizing individ-
ual well-being. Such fundamental transformation of culture may explain the identified shift-
ing support to important political objects of democracy.
Building Democracy: National and International Factors
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.71984
183
The scholarly interest in and study of the aggregated attitudes of citizens toward political 
objects has been related to research focused on the role of the civil society. Research on civil 
society has concerned people’s attitudes in a society toward political objects and the articula-
tion of such attitudes into organizations, associations, unions and interest clubs. One famous 
and now classical study on civil society is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America [36], where 
a nineteenth century American prosperous democracy was argued to be based on a highly 
developed civil society. The American democracy was dynamic, vital and stable due to the 
highly developed network of civil society across economic, social, cultural and religious orga-
nizations and associations. These patterns of civil society constituted a platform or arena for 
societal activities between the outer bounds of government and the inner bounds of fam-
ily ties and provided an interesting and important function for political life in democracies. 
The focus on the role of civil society re-emerged in the early 1990s with Putnam’s study, 
Making Democracy Work—Civic Traditions in Modern Italy [37], in which he analyzed potential 
ties between democratic stability, political institutions, socioeconomic factors and sociocul-
tural factors in northern and southern Italy. Such an approach questioned existing theories 
on socioeconomic factors and democratization and stressed the importance of civil society for 
institutional functionality, efficiency and democratic legitimacy. Democratic governance, it 
was argued, was based on the existence of a dynamic civil society of civic engagement, trust 
and reciprocity between citizens, which would foster improved political and administrative 
performances and legitimacy.
The growing bulk of studies over time on civil society and democracy has focused on the 
relationship between civil society and the state and has concluded a positive versus negative 
definition of a civil society. First, it has been argued that civil society may be a counter force 
to the state and, second, an arena or platform for civic education and participation [38]. The 
negative definition of a civil society refers to the counter force role a civil society may play in 
regulating and controlling the state and its performances. A civil society may function as an 
arena of civil society actors who balance the power of state institutions in relation to societal 
forces and who make sure that state’s institutions do not abuse their authority. On the other 
hand, the positive definition of the civil society refers to the assisting function civil society can 
have in relation to the state by providing an additional societal arena where citizens can meet, 
articulate, aggregate and associate freely and become aware of political life. A civil society 
may therefore contribute to ideas, expertise, norms and values and societal actions to alleviate 
the pressure on the state and to guide the state in new directions for policy-making. A civil 
society may therefore have different functions in a democracy and may be an essential part in 
a vital and consolidated democratic system.
A third and final set of identified domestic factors for democracy building—aside from socio-
economic factors and political culture—includes political institutions and the political role of 
domestic political elites and the masses. One of the first and most important studies about 
political institutions and democracy was written by Huntington: Political order in changing 
societies. In times of societal developments, it was argued that one of the unstable factors in 
a society was insufficient institutionalization: “[t]he primary problem of politics is the lag in 
the development of political institutions behind social and economic change” [39]. The focus 
on political institutions as pivotal to democracy stressed the danger of increased political 
and economic demands from societal forces and delayed political institutionalization. It was 
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argued that societal transformation led to increased societal demands on politics and how 
such demands had to be met by new institutional arrangements. Lack of institutionalization 
would jeopardize political order, as the political system would come under severe pressure 
and finally overload. Such institutional overload would provide grave danger to political 
order and lead to political illegitimacy and system collapse. Institutionalization, to safeguard 
political order, referred to the development of a strong multi-party system that could attract 
and mobilize people’s political concerns into the political system in an orderly fashion. By 
channeling people’s political demands into a political party’s system, democracy could prevail 
and avoid being challenged by unsatisfied revolutionary groups. Building democracy was 
therefore argued to be a process of institutionalization, in the establishment of functional polit-
ical parties, to ensure political participation. Political parties were essential for political order 
in that they provided instruments for attracting and representing interests and aggregating 
preferences. They were also tools for recruiting future politicians and institutionalizing elec-
tions by empowering political competitive alternatives and organizing the political agenda.
Research on political factors for democracy has also focused on the specific type of insti-
tutions that best favor democratic progress and stability. Studies have explored how to 
design or institutionally structure democracies in the best way to promote democracy and 
have assessed parliamentarism versus presidentialism. Such focus has, to a high extent, been 
based on the scholarly contributions by Linz and his colleagues. In his study, The Perils of 
Presidentalism [40], Linz argued that presidentialism is less favorable than parliamentarism 
for promoting and protecting stable democracies. Such conclusion was based on four perils 
of presidentialism. First, he argued that the nature of presidential elections (winner-take-all) 
could result in a presidency based on support from a minority of the electorate and provide a 
legitimacy gap. Second, he further argued that the fixed presidential terms and the many hin-
drances to change a president faces could be problematic for democratic vitality and change, 
especially when considering how the parliamentary system is more adjustable to changing 
conditions. Third, another danger was the divided legitimacy between the elected president 
and the elected members of Congress. Potential different political opinions between these two 
branches could lead to policy gridlock, declining political vitality and functionality and, in the 
long term, result in increasing societal demands, political illegitimacy and political instability 
with opportunities for undemocratic forces to take power. Fourth and finally, presidential-
ism could potentially foster personality politics and become open for inexperienced leaders 
to become president. Overall, the focus on presidentialism as less favorable for democracy 
than parliamentarism led to a growing number of studies about how to design democra-
cies with opposing views, using the pros and cons with different institutional arrangements. 
Dominating arguments have discussed potential weaknesses in the presidential systems, in 
minority presidents, rigid terms and difficulty of removal, policy gridlock and the election 
of inexperienced outsiders and how the parliamentary democracies have seemed to be more 
functional and long-lasting compared to presidential democracies. However, it should be 
stated that many studies have challenged these arguments or assumptions by pointing out 
favorable conditions within presidential democracies, but also how political instability may 
be caused by weak democratic structures rather than by presidentialism).
The research on political explanatory factors for democracy was developed further in the 
1980s by focusing on political actors in building democracy. Such an approach was referred to 
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as the transitology or the transition paradigm by stressing the importance of individual politi-
cal actors in the transition to democracy. Previous studies about political explanatory factors 
had been foremost focused on structural conditions, while these new studies shed light on 
political actions taken by formal political actors and societal forces beyond the political sys-
tem. O’Donnell et al. provided several studies in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule—Prospects 
for Democracy [41], Transitions from Authoritarian Rule—Southern Europe [42], Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule—Latin America [43], Transitions from Authoritarian Rule—Comparative 
Perspectives [44] and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule—Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies [45] and focused on political actors and their preferences in the political and soci-
etal system. These studies identified different fractions of the political elite; two of these frac-
tions within the dictatorial regime were the hardliners and softliners. Hardliners referred to 
the core of politicians against democracy and who viewed such a system as something that 
could bring chaos and disorder by undermining the existing privileges of the elite. It was 
further assessed how one group of hardliners firmly believed in the prevailing dictatorial sys-
tem, but how softliners within the elite were less ideologically oriented and more pragmatic, 
foremost concerned with selfish political motives. The dictating political elite were therefore 
divided into two groups: hardliners and softliners. Where the hardliners were prepared to 
use their authority through repression and violence to keep stability and status quo, the soft-
liners were open to limited political change to satisfy citizen demands or to increase quality of 
performances and receive legitimacy, as long as such political changes did not jeopardize the 
political survival of the elite. Therefore, softliners may be favorable for initiating democracy, 
but only if they believe that popular elections would result in a legitimate re-election of the 
same elite. These studies concluded that democracy could be built if there was a growing divi-
sion between hardliners and softliners within the dictatorial elite and if softliners were able to 
convince or force the hardliners to democratize the system.
The role of softliners was, to some extent, dependent on the role of societal forces beyond 
the political system. Studies on political actors and their preferences for building democracy 
also focused on two more groups of actors in the moderates and the radicals (revolutionaries) 
within the society outside the formal political system. It was argued that the radicals wanted 
to overthrow the illegitimate elite of hardliners and softliners, while the moderates were open 
to forging alliances with softliners within the elite to see democratic change. It was stressed in 
in these studies that the transition phase to democracy often began with a division between 
hardliners and softliners within the authoritarian regimes, but strategic linkages between 
elites and the societal masses were important. This combination of alliances within the politi-
cal elite and the societal groups outside the political system was referred to as the game of 
transition. The game of transition to democracy could take different paths. Democracy may 
result based on a pact between the dominating elite and the opposing elite to build democ-
racy, through a reform when the societal masses are stronger than the elites and would build 
democracy from the bottom up, but without using violence; through imposition when one 
group of the political elite mobilizes and uses violence to overthrow the regime (such elite is 
often the military); and finally, through revolution, when the societal masses (revolutionaries) 
are strong enough to overthrow the traditional ruling elite by violence. Most studies on the 
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game of transition have stressed the importance of the pact transition for democracy. Such a 
path would ensure an orderly progress toward democracy based on compromises and the 
growing trust between powerful elites. This path, based on a pact-strategy between elites, 
also limits the number of people engaged in the transition, which is favorable for further 
democratization, as fewer people bring involved improves the chances of reaching compro-
mises and does not led to an overload of political wants and demands. Further related studies 
on elites and masses have from an economic position argued that citizens prefer democratic 
systems due to the economic redistribution majority rule provide. This is in opposition to the 
elites that rather prefer nondemocratic political systems since they protect social and eco-
nomic privileges and represent a favorable system of redistribution for the people in power. 
Transition to democracy may, however, happen if concessions from the elites are not credible 
and when repression and the use of violence are perceived as too risky and too costly [46].
5. Building democracy: international factors
The above-identified domestic-oriented perspectives on socioeconomic, cultural and political 
factors have provided explanations for democratization. The complementary perspectives of 
explanatory factors for democratization shed light on important driving engines for building 
democracies around the world and have enlightened the public and those in academic life 
regarding when democracy is likely to happen. The bulk of studies have been comprehensive, 
but these perspectives have contained one important flaw: the neglect to focus on interna-
tional factors for democracy building. Until the 1990s, most research on how to build democ-
racy focused on domestic factors. The dominance of domestic factors was primarily due to 
two phenomena. One explanation for the domestic bias in research on democratization is 
the construction of separating academic disciplines in comparative politics and international 
relations where research on how to build democracy belonged to the former. The tradition 
of comparative politics was to focus on domestic structures and actors to explain political 
situations and changes. Scholars in international relations, however, were less interested in 
domestic politics and focused on how states and other powerful actors engage in diplomatic, 
economic and political relationships with others and with what motives and impact they do 
so. Another explanation for the domestic bias in research has concerned the fuzzy idea of 
what really constitutes the international factors, reaching for any structures and/or actors in 
the world beyond the state’s territory. This has made potential international explanatory fac-
tors to democracy hard to pin down, which has left many scholars abandoning international 
perspectives on democracy building.
Some significant research efforts for identifying the international dimension to political 
change began in the 1960s. In a time of decolonization, a large number of studies focused on 
political and economic linkages and dependencies between developed and less-developed 
states. It was argued that international political and economic structures penetrated state bor-
ders and provided links between powerful and less-powerful actors. The notion of links and 
penetrated systems was especially explored among scholars within the dependency school, 
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arguing that third-world states were influenced by rich states in the West based on an unjusti-
fied and unequal world economic structure. The criticism, however, pointed out the lack of 
specificity of how to analyze and understand international factors and how and when domes-
tic politics and economics were influenced by or dictated by external forces.
It was argued that states were open systems vulnerable for penetration and that developed 
and powerful states could have a political impact on democracy building [47]. For instance, 
Rosenaue identified the link politics between the international and national domains as “any 
recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another” [48] 
and focused on the potential impact such links could have on democracy. In the 1990s, the 
debate about the international dimension re-emerged in the scholarly debate on globalization. 
The quickly growing number of studies about globalization covered the diffusion of global 
characteristics within economics, technology, culture and politics and stated a growing notion 
of interdependence in the world. It was further argued that economic, technological, cultural 
and political transformations across borders of intensification of interactions, exchanges and 
meetings led to a de-territorialization of politics in favor of macro-regional, international and 
global actors and processes. Globalization and global politics were portrayed as enhanced 
interdependence where global changes were cutting through state borders by challenging 
the domestic political, economic and cultural domestic structures by decreasing geographical 
distances around the world [49].
Research on the international dimension on democracy building, triggered by the studies 
on globalization, peaked with the end of the Cold War and with the increased power within 
the West. It resulted in the conceptualization of the international dimension to democracy in 
democratic diffusion and democratic promotion. First, the diffusion of democracy was argued 
to happen between nearby locations and between geographical locations far away with simi-
lar political, economic and cultural structures (or historical ties). It was stated that the spread 
of democracy was facilitated by political, cultural and economic salience often provided by 
geographical proximity, but diffusion could happen as a global phenomenon in a world of 
decreasing geographical distances. Diffusion of democracy was one important dimension of 
globalization—aside from the spread of economic liberalism and technology—and embedded 
the growing popularity of installing democratic governance [50]. The diffusion of democracy 
from one state or region to another required diffusion agents to assist the spread of demo-
cratic rights and liberties. Diffusion agents acted as socialization agents within the transna-
tional networks and domestic domain, interpreting and introducing global norms and values 
to domestic settings.
A second international dimension factor for building democracy has been democracy promo-
tion. Research on democracy promotion has been based on traditional insights from inter-
national relations and foreign policy-making, focusing on international actors’ motives and 
methods. The foreign policy analysis has displayed a growing interest in democracy promo-
tion in which democracy promotion has referred to a foreign policy motivation to impact other 
governments and nations in a pro-democratic direction. Studies during the 1990s [51] argued 
that democracy promotion were essential factors for the global scope of democratization by 
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identifying powerful actors, such as the European Union, the Organizations of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the United States, among others, and the declining power of Soviet 
Union. These actors promoted democratic ideas and encouraged governments and people 
around the world to launch democratic reforms, which led to transitions and, in the long run, 
snowballing effects on a growing number of states. The links between international democracy 
promotion and transitions were clarified through important research, such as in Pridham’s 
study: Encouraging Democracy—the international context of regime transition in Southern Europe 
[52] and Building Democracy—The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe 
[53]. Pridham argued that international factors played a significant role in democracy build-
ing and discussed how such factors had had an increased role in explaining the transitions to 
democracy in Europe from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Another impressive study on the international factors for democratization was Whitehead’s 
study, The International Dimensions of Democratization—Europe and the Americas [54], which 
conceptualized different methods or modes of democracy promotion in contagion, control 
and consent from a comparative perspective across the Atlantic. Schmitter [55] added a 
fourth mode in conditional cooperation and illustrated different actors, motives and pro-
cesses that could shed light on the international factors for democracy. Conditional coop-
eration referred to the international influence on domestic democracy building based on 
the use of carrots and sticks. Democracy promotion was often implemented by offering 
political, economic and/or technological assistance and support (carrots) tied to formal-
ized democratic demands on the reforms to be taken. Control, on the other hand, implies a 
mode based on coercive political, economic and/or military methods to see democratization 
without the necessary domestic consent through deliberate, forceful acts. Such a mode of 
influence could include intervention and isolation to enforce the transition to democratic 
institutions and political culture. In sharp contrast to control, contagion implies a mode of 
non-coercive impact where domestic democratic reforms are a consequence of the spirit of 
the time, the global surge of democracy and the domino effects from other states’ transi-
tions; that is, what was previously discussed in this chapter as the diffusion of democracy as 
a political idea and encouragement to dare to change domestic institutions in a democratic 
direction. In contemporary research on democracy building, international factors are sys-
tematically considered as explanatory factors, leaving national and international factors as 
equally important to take into consideration when trying to explain transitions to democ-
racy around the world. In a globalized world order, national and international factors to 
democracy building are interwoven leaving scholars with a wide range of potential explana-
tory factors to be considered.
6. Final remarks
Democracy refers to the government by the people. It ensures contestation and participation 
and provides citizens with political rights and civil liberties that promote popular freedom. 
Democratic systems have been challenged by nondemocratic systems and ideas over time. In 
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the early twenty-first century, we have seen more democratic states than ever, with expanded 
freedoms in political rights and civil liberties, although an authoritarian upsurge is identified. 
Such authoritarian upsurge challenges electoral processes, political pluralism and participa-
tion, freedom of expression, associational and organizational rights and the rule of law, etc. 
This chapter has discussed the state-of-the-art research about factors favorable for building 
democracy in a time of authoritarian upsurge. So where do we stand today when we try to 
understand the possibilities and problems for democratic transitions? The research from the 
1950s forward has developed explanatory factors for democracy building by pointing out 
national and international factors. This study identified the most important factors from a 
socioeconomic, cultural and political perspective. It was further argued that the international 
factors for democracy building, until recently, have constituted forgotten factors for democ-
racy. This has been due to the comparative approach of most democratization studies and to 
the problems of conceptualizing international factors. However, this chapter presented two 
important international factors in democracy diffusion and democracy promotion. These fac-
tors complement the traditional domestic-oriented understandings of explanatory factors for 
democratization.
Based on decades of study about democracy building, contemporary research has con-
tinued to focus on national or international explanatory factors on the one hand and how 
links between the two groups of factors may interact on the other. Though international 
factors have come to play a much more important role in explaining transitions to democ-
racy than before, today, it is the links between international democracy diffusion and 
democracy promotion and domestic salience that are in focus. This has led to a re-focus 
on political aelites and civil society actors as domestic democracy agents and gatekeepers 
in relation to external pro-democratic pressure. However, in a time of a reawakening of 
authoritarianism in the world, international pro-democratic forces are under heavy pres-
sure from antidemocratic regimes. This has resulted in further studies on international 
politics regarding democratization and the balance of power between major states and 
international organizations and how certain states may be under international pressure 
and at a crossroads between democracy and authoritarianism. This has especially been the 
case in contemporary Eastern Europe and East Asia with the rising international power of 
Russia and China. Contemporary research on democracy building has become even more 
complex and requires scholarly collaboration between researchers belonging to compara-
tive and international politics. It requires a firm understanding of national and interna-
tional explanatory factors, but also how such factors may interact [56]. Based on previous 
research, long-term structural factors are important to build democracy. Such factors are 
economic prosperity, civil society activities, popular mobilization and political institu-
tions. But actor-oriented factors are also crucial to understand democracy building in the 
short-run. It is foremost the different domestic elites and their perceptions, behavior and 
strategies that may provide window of opportunities for transitions to happen. In addi-
tion, national determinants to democratization must be linked to international factors in 
actors, structures and processes that penetrates state borders and may be prodemocratic or 
antidemocratic in nature.
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